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FROM PAPAL BULL TO RACIAL RULE: INDIANS OF THE
AMERICAS, RACE, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
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The "discovery" and conquest of the "New World" marked the
inauguration of international law,' and constituted a watershed
moment in the emergence of race in European thought.2 What might
the coterminous rise of formative. moments in race thinking and
international law suggest? In my provisional reflections on this
question that follow, I trace juridical and religio-racial conceptions of
indigenous peoples of the Americas as a central thread in the
evolution of international law.
I will begin with a discussion of the fifteenth-century papal bulls
issued in regard to the Portugal-Spain disputes over lands in Africa
and the Americas. I will then proceed to follow some strands of racial
and juridical thought in the accounts of Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo
Grotius, two founding figures in international law. I suggest that
Vitoria's treatise, On the Indians Lately Discovered,3 evinces the
beginnings of the shift Carl Schmitt identifies from the papal authority
of the respublica Christiana to modern international law. 4 Vitoria's
account, moreover, is both proto-secular and proto-racial.
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Springfield, J.D./Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2006.
1. See, e.g., CARL ScHMrT,
THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE Jus PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 49 (G. L. Ulmen trans.,

2003).
2.

DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS

OF MEANING 62 (1993).

3. Vitoria's lecture De Indis Noviter Inventis is translated as "On the Indians
Lately Discovered." The version cited hereinafter is published together with his
lecture titled De Jure Bellis Hispanorum in Barbaros("On the Law of War Made by
the Spaniards on the Barbarians") in FRANCISCUS DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE
BELLI RELECTIONES (Ernest Nys ed., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1917).

4. SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 57-138. Schmitt uses "respublica Christiana"to
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Then, examining two essays by Grotius-MareLiberum5 in 1608
and On the Origin of the Native Races of America6 in 1642-I will
illustrate that one may observe continuities with and breaks from
Vitoria's thought. With Grotius, a shift from papal authority to title
by discovery and occupation becomes clearly evident. His 1642 text
also evinces early conceptions of race in terms of lineage. Taking his
two works together, I suggest that a "liquefaction"' of land-in which
"discovered" lands are conceived as "free sea"-occurs alongside
early racial thinking that would enable the fixing of racial others as
titleless inhabitants. We may see early examples of race's "fixity and
fluidity"8 in the formation of modern international law, as it was
marked by racially-inflected fluidization and fixing. Finally, in the
last section, I discuss briefly Johnson v. M'Intosh,9 noting that the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision indicates a shift from Christian
republic to racially-ordered international law.
I. RESPUBLICA CHRISTIANA

As Carl Schmitt notes, in the medieval Christian republic the
Church was a central authority that presided over divisions of land.
He observes, "[t]hose Christian princes and peoples who were
engaged in land- and sea-appropriations, still within the spatial order
of the respublica Christiana of the Middle Ages, had a common
ground in their Christian faith and a common authority in the head of
the Church, the Roman pope."' 0 Thus, these Christian sovereigns

refer to the "Christian empire" of the Middle Ages. Id. at 59.
5. HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH
BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (James Brown

Scott ed., Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1608)
[hereinafter GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS].
6.

HUGO GROTIUs, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIVE RACES OF AMERICA

(Edmund Goldsmid trans., Privately Printed 1884) (1642) [hereinafter GROTIUS, ON
THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIVE RACES OF AMERICA].

7. Gil Anidjar, TerrorRight, NEW CENTENNIAL REVIEW, Winter 2004, at 43.

8. Ann Laura Stoler, Racial Histories and their Regimes of Truth, in 11
POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY 183, 198 (Diane E. Davis ed., 1997).

9.

Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).

10. SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 92.
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regarded "each other as equal parties to a treaty of division and
distribution concerning land-appropriation.""
In the bull Romanus Pontifex issued in 1455, Pope Nicholas V
settled a dispute over land in Africa between Portugal and Spain by
granting Portugal exclusive rights to conquer and trade in an extensive
southern region of the continent. 12 The goal of universal salvation, the
bull opines, "will more certainly come to pass.. . if we bestow
suitable favors and special graces on those Catholic kings and
princes" 3 who "not only restrain the savage excesses of the Saracens
and of other infidels, enemies of the Christian name, but also for the
defense and increase of the faith vanquish them and their kingdoms
and

habitations. . . and subject them

to their

own

temporal

dominion."' 4 The bull thus indirectly associates African lands with
"Saracens and other infidels."15
Awarding favors and graces in this instance to Portugal's
monarch, the bull provides that "the right of conquest" that "we
declare to be extended from the capes of Bojador and of Nao, as far as
through all Guinea, and beyond toward that southern shore" belongs
to "King Alfonso, his successors, and the infante, and not to any
others."' 6 Then in the last decade of the fifteenth century, following
the "discoveries" made by Columbus in the Americas, Pope
Alexander VI issued the bull Inter Caetera, which indicated more
explicitly that only Christian rulers could legitimately claim land
ownership.17 Addressing the "New World" land claims of Spain and
Portugal, the Inter Caetera granted to the former's King Ferdinand
and Queen Isabella "countries and islands thus unknown and hitherto
discovered by your envoys and to be discovered hereafter, provided
however they at no time have been in the actual temporal possession
11. Id.
12. The Bull Romanus Pontifex (Nicolas V), January 8, 1455, translated in
EUROPEAN TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
DEPENDENCIES TO 1648, at 9 (Frances Gardiner Davenport ed., 1967) [hereinafter
EUROPEAN TREATIES].

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
The Bull Inter Caetera (Alexander VI), May 3, 1493, translated in
EUROPEAN TREATIES, supra note 11, at 56.
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of any Christian owner."18 Through the twilight of the medieval
period, the pope served as an adjudicative authority that resolved
disputes over "new" lands, recognizing Christian governments as the
sole candidates for ownership.
As the medieval order shifted, however, another source of
authority had to settle conflicting claims to land. After the spatial
order of the respublica Christianaand its theological arguments were
undermined, Schmitt argues, Eurocentric international law was
compelled to discover the basis of its global order: "the only
justification for the great land-appropriations of non-European
territory by European powers was discovery."19
The beginnings of this shift from papal authority to title by
discovery, and from religious to racial otherness, may be glimpsed, I
suggest, in the account of the Spanish theologian and jurist Francisco
de Vitoria. Although Vitoria rejected discovery as a basis for land
title, his work was influential in the move Schmitt identifies from a
Christian republic to a Eurocentric law of nations.
II. VITORIA "ON THE INDIANS"

Vitoria's account is both proto-racial and proto-secular. In his De
Indis treatise, he argued that the "unbelief' of non-Christians could
not in itself preclude them from owning public or private property:
"unbelief does not prevent anyone from being a true owner," as
"ownership and dominion are based on natural or on human law;
therefore they are not destroyed by want of faith." 2 0 He also
advocated a significant curtailment of the pope's geopolitical
jurisdiction, declaring that "[t]he Pope is not civil or temporal lord of
the whole world in the proper sense of the words 'lordship' and 'civil

18. Id. at 62. Davenport notes that the bulls Eximiae devotionis of May 3,
1493 and Inter caetera of May 4, 1493 restate and jointly supersede the bull Inter
caetera of May 3. Id. at 71. The later Inter caetera establishes a new line of
demarcation and land acquisition rights that privilege Castile more strongly, and
includes language of Christian proprietorship similar to its predecessor document of

May 3: "With this proviso however that none of the [lands] beyond that said line ...
be in the actual possession of any Christian king or prince." Id. at 77.
19. SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 131.
20. VITORIA, supra note 3, at 123.
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power."' 2 1 Marking a boundary of papal authority, he specifies, "[t]he
Pope has temporal power only so far as it is in subservience to matters
spiritual, that is, as far as is necessary for the administration of
spiritual affairs." 22 Vitoria accordingly seeks to enforce a division
between the temporal and the spiritual, and to divest the pope of
authority over the temporal domain. In this aspect of Vitoria's
account, one may see a thread of an evolving secularist logic. 2 3
Vitoria further evokes secularism with his reference to "the law of
nations (fus gentium), which either is natural law or is derived from
natural law." 24 Jus gentium is "what natural reason has established
among all nations."25 In De Indis, as Anghie observes, jus gentium,
which is determined through reason, replaces divine law administered
by the pope. 26 For Vitoria, "[n]atural law administered by sovereigns
rather than divine law articulated by the pope becomes the source of
international law governing Spanish-Indian relations." 27
Under the law of nations, Vitoria contends that the Spaniards have
various enumerated rights, which include travel, trade, and other
forms of commerce. 28 Additionally, as he delimits papal jurisdiction,
Vitoria does not, of course, erase religion from his account, but rather
resituates it as a "right" in his jus gentium structure of ownership and
He writes, "[a]nother possible title is by way of
dominion.
propagation of Christianity. In this connection let my first proposition
be: Christians have a right to preach and declare the Gospel in
barbarian lands." 29 And this Christian right of missioning is
paramount, with grave implications for the peoples in those lands,
because if the Indians prevent the Spaniards from freely preaching the
21. Id. at 135.
22. Id. at 136.
23. For a discussion of the complexities of secularization, see generally GIL
ANIDJAR, SEMITES: RACE, RELIGION, LITERATURE (2008).
24. VITORIA, supranote 3, at 151.
25. Id.
26. Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of
InternationalLaw, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 89, 94 (Eve Darian-Smith &

Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 1999).
27.

Id. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE

MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).

28.

See VITORIA, supra note 3, at 153-54.

29. Id. at 156.
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Gospel, Vitoria asserts the Spaniards "may preach it despite their
unwillingness and devote themselves to the conversion of the people
in question, and if need be they may then accept or even make war,
until they succeed in obtaining facilities and safety for preaching the
Gospel." 30 As Anghie notes, while Vitoria curtails the power of the
pope, once he establishes "the authority of a secularjus gentium that is
administered by the sovereign, he reintroduces Christian norms within
this secular system; proselytizing is authorized now, not by divine
law, but the law of nations, and may be likened now to the secular
activities of traveling and trading." 3 1
Significantly, Vitoria advances his proto-secular ideas with a
resituated Christianity in De Indis, and though he does not use
explicitly the term "race" in his account, one may discern a racial
sketch of the Indian as a domesticable, virtual-animal other.
Indigenous peoples are not "irrational animals" who lack dominion,
Vitoria argues. 32 Rather, he implies that they are more analogous to
"boys," who, despite "seem[ing] to differ little from irrational
animals ... even before they have the use of reason, can have
dominion." 33 For Vitoria, in Pagden's elaboration, the Indian is
"some variety of [a] fully grown child whose rational faculties are
complete but still potential rather than actual."3 4 As Vitoria suggests
the cultivability of the Indian, he is a predecessor of the likes of Las
Casas. 35 Thus, in Vitoria's thought, a racial conception emerges
alongside a reconfiguration of religion. His account conceives of
indigenous peoples as a religio-racial civilizing project, and articulates

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 157.
Anghie, supra note 26, at 97.
VITORIA, supra note 3, at 126.
Id. at 127.

34. ANTHONY PAGDEN, THE FALL OF NATURAL MAN: THE AMERICAN INDIAN
AND THE ORIGINS OF COMPARATIVE ETHNOLOGY 104 (1982).

35. Another similarity between Vitoria and Las Casas is indicated by
Goldberg's comment on the latter: "the humanism of Las Casas's incipient
egalitarianism was perhaps still less racial than it was religious, for it consisted in
the capacity of the American Indians to be Christianized." GOLDBERG, supra note 2,
at 26. For Las Casas, the debate between him and Sepulveda marks "the onset not
the high point of modernity, for it is the capacity to be Christianized that constitutes
the egalitarian principle." Id.
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nascent racial notions together with newly circumscribed religious
"rights."
Despite positing the domesticability and proprietary capacity of
indigenous peoples, however, Vitoria provides for the taking of their
lands. He concludes that while a people's lack of Christian faith per
se is not a legitimate ground for seizing dominion, a war waged to
secure the right of missioning is just, and indigenous peoples' lands
may be rightly appropriated in the course of such a just war. 36
Vitoria rejects discovery and occupation as a basis of land title,
"because, for him, the territory of America was neither free nor
unclaimed." 37 The papal mandate, then, "even if only indirectly, by
means of a just war, was the true legal title to the conquista."38
Vitoria, Schmitt observes, thus remains a theologian, and regarding
"the relation between theological and juridical thinking, and the
question ofjusta causa," his "thinking belongs to the Christian Middle
Ages, rather than to the modem international law among European
states."39
Yet Vitoria's proto-racial and proto-secular thought also signals a
shift into the epoch of modernity. Although he asserts that "the
barbarians were true owners" 40 of lands in the Americas, Vitoria
concludes De Indis (as Schmitt notes) "with the claim that the Spanish
are waging a just war, and therefore may annex Indian lands if the
Indians resist free commercium (not only 'trade') and the free mission
of Christianity." 41 Religion in this scheme is not the source of
sovereign authority, but a vitally conceived component in a set of
delineated "rights" that the sovereign shall "protect" (or enforce).
This shifting role of religion and the rule of law became apparent
in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century international law when the
papally-awarded legal titles of Portugal and Spain were no longer
valid, leaving "discovery and occupation as the only legal title to landappropriation recognized by the European powers." 42 With the
36.
37.
38.
39.

See VITORIA, supra note 3, at 154-56.
SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 112.

Id.
Id. at 121.

40. VITORIA, supra note 3, at 139.
41. SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 92.

42. Id. at 138.
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receding role of religion as a source of legal authority, race began to
shape the emergent modem international law. This transition may be
glimpsed in the movement from the treatise of Vitoria to the work of
Hugo Grotius, one of the "most celebrated and influential teachers of
seventeenth-century international law." 43
III. GROTIUS'S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RACE

I will focus on two of Grotius's less-discussed works. The first is
Mare Liberum (The Freedom of the Seas), published anonymously for
an objective indicated in its subtitle, "the right which belongs to the
Dutch to take part in the East Indian trade." 44 As the introduction to
the English translation explains, Grotius had apparently been "retained
by the Dutch East India Company to justify the capture by one of its
ships of a Portuguese galleon in the straits of Malacca" in 1602.45
A. Grotius on Free Seas
In The Freedom of the Seas, Grotius follows (and extends) the
proto-secularism of Vitoria.46 The Dutch jurist approvingly cites
Vitoria's position on the rights of missioning and free commercium as
a basis of just war. Vitoria, he explains, "holds that the Spaniards
could have shown just reasons for making war upon the Aztecs and
the Indians in America . ..

if they really were prevented from

traveling or sojourning among those peoples, and. . . finally if they
were debarred from trade." 47 In accord with Vitoria's provisos,
Grotius suggests that when the Portuguese arrived, the lands of the
East Indians were not res nullius (belonging to no one), for "although
some of them were idolators, and some Mohammedans, and therefore
43. Id. at 134.
44. GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, supra note 5.

45. James Brown Scott, Introductory Note to GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE
SEAS, supra note 5, at vi.
46. Scott argues that Grotius should be "considered a member of the Victorian
or . . . Spanish school, in that he derived his doctrine on the law of nature and of
nations from members of the Spanish school." JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH
ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF

NATIONS 9a-Oa (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2008) (1934).
47. GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, supra note 5, at 9.
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sunk in grievous sin, [they] had none the less perfect public and
private ownership of their goods and possessions." 48 He concurs with
Vitoria's argument that the East Indians could not be dispossessed for
unbelief or without just cause. 49 Grotius thus adheres to Vitoria's
reinscription of Christianity in a secularized structure of international
law.
The third chapter of The Freedom of the Seas, the heading of
which declares that "the Portuguese have no right of sovereignty over
the East Indies by virtue of title based on the Papal Donation," further
undertakes a Vitoria-like secularist move.o Grotius proceeds to
pronounce that "the Pope is neither civil nor temporal Lord of the
whole world. On the contrary, even if the Pope did have any such
power on earth, still he would not be right in using it, because he
ought to be satisfied with his own spiritual jurisdiction."" He thus
echoes Vitoria's nascently secularist deprivation of the papal
jurisdiction over the temporal realm.
Moreover, Grotius argues, even if the Pope had intended to give
to the Portuguese (or Spanish) monarchs a land grant by the 1493
papal bull, "and had had the power to make such a gift, still it would
not have made the Portuguese sovereigns of those places. For it is not
a donation that makes a sovereign, it is the consequent delivery of a
thing and the subsequent possession thereof." 52 In Grotius's account,
we see continuities with Vitoria's secularist delimitation of the pope's
jurisdiction over the temporal domain and the division of land.
Yet in a significant break from Vitoria, Grotius endorsed the
discovery doctrine, while he maintained that discovery in combination
with possession or occupation would confer title. Possession (and
occupation) would be crucial elements of legal title for Grotius. He
claimed that "[tihe Portuguese have no right by title of discovery to
sovereignty over the East Indies to which the Dutch make voyages"
because they failed the test of discovery and possession." "[N]atural
reason itself [and] the precise words of the law . .. show clearly that
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 11.
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the act of discovery is sufficient to give a clear title of sovereignty
only when it is accompanied by actual possession."5 4 This applies to
"movables or to such immovables [i.e., land] as are actually inclosed
within fixed bounds and guarded. No such claim can be established in
the present case, because the Portuguese maintain no garrisons in
those regions."55 Here Grotius foreshadows the Lockean inclosure as
a means of land appropriation.5 6
Additionally, instead of theology, Grotius here privileges reason
and (in invoking the "precise words of the law"57 ) a positivistic,
formal conception of law. Thus, he remains in the tradition of Vitoria
in some important respects, especially in his proto-secularist
divestment of papal temporal authority and reinscription of the right of
missioning. Yet Grotius further marks the shift from Christian
republic to a secular international law. I suggest below that Grotius's
work indicates that this transition to modern international law is
marked by race, and, relatedly, by emerging conceptions of land and
sea.
B. Sea Changes
Schmitt notes that Grotius's book and its title, Mare Liberum, was
"trail-blazing,"58 as it "signaled the development of a new stage of the
freedom of the sea." 59 Writing in defense (particularly against
Portugal) of the Dutch East India Company's right of navigation,
Grotius enunciated principles of the legal status of the sea that became
crucially formative of international law. 60
54. Id. at 12.
55. Id.
56. See generally JOHN LOCKE, LOCKE: Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689).
57.

GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, supra note 5, at 12.

58. SCHMITT,supra note 1, at 179.
59. Id. at 180.
60. See id What the context of the East Indian trade itself suggests about the
racial formation of Grotius's thought (and of international law generally) is a
question for further research. Indeed, Grotius's assertion that "the East Indians" are
"intelligent and shrewd, so that a pretext for subduing them on the ground of their
character could not be sustained" suggests racial differentiation, even if it might
arguably be interpreted as a claim of racial egalitarianism. GROTIUs, THE FREEDOM
OF THE SEAS, supra note 5, at 13-14.
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In his exposition on the sea, Grotius writes, "public territory arises
out of the occupation of nations, just as private property arises out of
the occupation of individuals."6' Announcing the freedom of the seas,
he posits, "neither a nation nor an individual can establish any right of
private ownership over the sea itself (I except inlets of the sea),
inasmuch as its occupation is not permissible by nature or on grounds
of public utility." 62 The sea, then, could not be appropriated by
discovery and occupation: "[I]f the Portuguese call occupying the sea
merely to have sailed over it before other people .. . could anything in
the world be more ridiculous?" 63 With this logic, Grotius signals the
inauguration of an international rule of law that protects the freedom
of the seas-"[H]e who prevents another from navigating the sea has
no support in law," and the navigation right of the Dutch "rests upon a
common right, since it is universally admitted that navigation on the
sea is open to any one [sic]." 64 In a sense, the sea is like what Locke
described as "great tracts of ground" that "lie waste, and are more than
the People, who dwell on it, do, or can make use of, and so still lie in
common." 65 With this brief linking of Grotius and Locke, I suggest
that associating the inappropriable sea with wasted (or empty) land
subject to appropriation was a formative element of modern
international law. Grotius's account in Mare Liberum further
indicates that race figured constitutively in this conjunction of
appropriable land and inappropriable sea, and in the development of
international law. I discuss his racial conceptions next, lingering in
one of his later tracts, On the Origin of the Native Races ofAmerica.66
C. The Sea ofRace
Following Schmitt, Gil Anidjar notes the "liquefaction" of land,
whereby "the conquest of the New World defined entire stretches of
territorial spaces as 'free space,' defining them, in other words, as sea

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
note 6.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 44.
LOCKE, supra note 56, at 299.
See GROTIUS, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIVE RACES OF AMERICA, supra
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spaces." 67 Grotius's racial thinking marks an elemental moment in
this rise of the notion of appropriable land with dispossessable
inhabitants; this idea was crucially formative in international law.
"I have often wondered," muses Grotius at the opening of his
essay, "that no one from among so many learned men of our age has
earnestly investigated whence those nations sprung which, before the
advent of the Spaniards, inhabited the continent, which, unknown to
the ancients, some of us have called America from Vespucius, others
Western India." 68 Speaking approximately of indigenous peoples of
North America, Grotius suggests they are of Nordic ancestry,
descended from migrant Norsemen who had inhabited Iceland and
Greenland.69 Yet for Grotius, the indigenous Americans represented
German, Norwegian, and Scandinavian customs of the distant past,
frozen in primitivity. The customs of "the Mexicans and their
neighbours" 70 provide "no slight mark of their origin," 7' Grotius
argues: "Their judges are twelve in number, as there were formerly
among the Goths and other nations of Scandinavia." 7 2 Grotius thus
purports to follow the cultural lineage of North American Indians. His
focus on origins and lineage is a mark of early thinking. For example,
Goldberg argues that in the early modern development of race
thinking, the "general commitment to race as lineage" prevailed
''against the background of this early emphasis upon descent in terms
of origin, breed, or stock." 73 Grotius's quest for the origins of the
indigenous peoples of the Americas is a similar attempt to trace racial
lines. His 1642 essay invokes a disjunction of race from religion,
indicating another shift from the thought of his juridical-theological
ancestors.
In regard to native peoples of "Yucatan, and some neighbouring
districts," Grotius claims, "the rite of circumcision discovered among

67. Anidjar, supra note 7, at 56.
68. HuGo GROTIUS, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIVE RACES OF AMERICA,
supra note 6, at 8.
69. Id. at 10. "[T]he peoples of America, those who are towards the north on
this side . .. [of] the Isthmus of Panama are of Norse descent ..... Id.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id.
73.

GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE, supra note 2, at 63.
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them proves to us that they are of a different origin."7 4 He rejects,
however, evidence suggesting "that they were Jews," descended from
"the ten tribes driven into Media."75 He concurs with "Peter the
Martyr," who postulated the migration of some people to another
shore
from iEthiopia by the adjacent ocean, which might easily happen to
fisherman sailing a certain distance from their own coast, and then
caught by the furious winds, which would carry them directly into
America-such a fate as befell that sailor from whom Columbus
derived his knowledge of the new world, and those Indians who,
Pliny informs us, were borne to the shores of the Suevi. 76
Reinforcing his link between indigenous Americans and Ethiopians,
Grotius notes, "to be circumcised is an old practice of the
kEthiopians," and "[n]or did those of the Ethiopians who became
Early modem
Christians abandon the old practice of their race.
evidenced
often
Grotius's)
religious-racial thought (including
Geraldine Heng's characterization (in a medieval context) of
"European Christianity" as a discursive "formation," and what she
describes as the functioning of "race-and-religion-'race-religion' . . .
as a single indivisible discourse."78 However, Grotius defines
Ethiopians by a racial marker that religious conversion does not alter.
Lineage, moreover, racially links Ethiopians and native peoples in the
Americas.
Grotius's text also features an early cultural-linguistic conception
of racial difference. In the central part of the Americas, "in the range
of country from the North to the Isthmus of Panama," he writes, "the
language is neither clearly }Ethiopian nor clearly Norwegian." 79 He
believes this is partly because "men of different races were mingled

74.

GROTIUS, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIVE RACES OF AMERICA, supra note

6, at 14.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 15-16.
77. Id. at 16.
78. GERALDINE

HENG, EMPIRE OF MAGIC: MEDIEVAL ROMANCE AND THE
POLITICS OF CULTURAL FANTASY 234 (2003).
79. GROTIUS, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIVE RACES OF AMERICA, supra note

6, at 17.
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together."80 Thus, Grotius describes racial groups as distinct linguistic
breeds with implications of miscegenation.
Referring finally "to the other part of America which extends
from the Isthmus of Panama to the Straits of Magellan," Grotius
observes that "the more highly-refined minds of the Peruvians, their
capacity for just and extended government, testify to another origin,
which, if I see anything, can be no other than from the Chinese, a race
of equal elegance and equal imperial ability.""1 Additionally, he
muses, "[t]he writing of the Peruvians is not by means of letters, but
by marks denoting the things, and it is, as in China, from the top of the
paper to the bottom." 82 These ruminations on racial origins by a
founding figure of the modern law of nations suggest that race is
inscribed at the origins of international law. Approximately two
centuries after Grotius's reflections, a germinal U.S. Supreme Court
decision would further indicate a shift to Grotian logic and the
centrality of race in the development of international law.
IV. JOHNSON v. M'INTOSH AND THE UNITED STATES
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE

In the last section that follows, I suggest that the U.S. Supreme
Court decision of Johnson v. M'Intosh83 evinces a juridical shift in the
United States from papal to Vitorian and Grotian logic in regard to
international law, religion, and race. Johnson articulates echoes of the
papal bulls with a secularized, Vitoria-like jus gentium, a welding of
race and religion, and an emphasis on racial differentiation.
In both the U.S. Supreme Court's nineteenth-century
pronouncement of the discovery doctrine in Johnson v. M'Intosh84 and
the papal bulls (Romanus Pontifex and Inter Caetera),8 one finds
similar provisions of the exclusive Christian/European eligibility for
land title. Johnson v. M'Intosh inflects papal-paralleling discourses as
it expressly weds the requirement of Christianity and European

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 19.
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
Id.

85.

EUROPEAN TREATIES, supra notes 12 and 17.
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heritage for land ownership and reinscribes the Christianity
prerequisite (following a reasoning akin to Vitoria's) in a framework
of a (secular) international law. The case thus illustrates the shift
Schmitt poses from a respublica Christiana to a "Eurocentric
international law."86 Moreover, as discussed below in the Johnson
decision, this shift is expressly bound to racial-epistemological
conceptions of indigenous peoples.
To "avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each
other," Chief Justice Marshall writes, it was necessary for:
the potentates of the world . . . to establish a principle, which all

should acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition,
which they all asserted, should be regulated as between themselves.

This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by
whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all
other Europeangovernments, which title might be consummated by

possession. 87

Referred to as the discovery doctrine, the Supreme Court deemed the
acquisition of title by discovery the exclusive prerogative of European
nations, following logic similar in structure to the Christianity
criterion for ownership in the papal bulls. The discovery doctrine
demarcated land rights for European sovereigns while excluding
indigenous peoples as recognizable owners of territory; as Williams
remarks, in Chief Justice Marshall's analysis, "American Indian tribes
had no theoretical, independent natural-law-based right to full
sovereignty over America's soil that a European discoverer might be
required to recognize under Europe's Law of Nations."88
Preemptively excluding them from title by discovery, the Supreme
Court viewed indigenous peoples as mere "occupants of the soil,"89 as
objects in the landscape of an agreement delineating property rights
86. SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 49.
87. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572-73 (emphasis added).
88. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 313 (1990). As Williams also notes,
"according to Johnson, while the Founders may not have been able to agree on
whether the several states or Congress held the title to the western frontier, they
were unanimous in their agreement that the Indians' interest in their lands was
inferior to that of a European-derived government." Id. at 315.
89. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
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between European states. Viewed as objects of European agreement
and as part of the "discoverable" natural environment and consigned
to the thing-ness of object-being, indigenous peoples were denied the
subjectivity of those deemed racially eligible to discover.
The Court further contends that observing the discovery doctrine
was common international practice. Chief Justice Marshall proceeds
to demonstrate the "universal recognition" of the doctrine by
enumerating the European nations, including Spain, Portugal, France,
and Holland, that had asserted it as a basis for claims to land in
America. 90 But instead of a papal mandate, the Court invokes
international "custom," which is a source of modern international law.
In Johnson then, one may discern that the transition Schmitt observes
has come to pass and papal authority has given way to the order of a
Eurocentric international law. 9 1 Moreover, the racial configuration of
the discovery doctrine in Johnson indicates a shift from a primarily
religiously-ordered system of Christian nations to an international
regime with race as a predominant ordering term.
The Supreme Court also refers to European and Christian
sovereigns interchangeably as the exclusive candidates for land
ownership. 92 Thus, we may observe in Johnson a modern example of
"race-and-religion" or "race-religion" as an "indivisible discourse." 93
In the Supreme Court's enunciation of the discovery doctrine, race
and religion are operating (again) in tangled co-constitutiveness as
they did in early modernity. But with race in the foreground of legal
discourses, their modalities and landscapes have changed. As race has
shaped the terrain of domestic and international law, the Court's
opinion indicates that religion has concurrently undergone shifts in
structure and signification with the rise of secularism. Johnson v.
M'Intosh rearticulated earlier modern iterations of Christianity as a
criterion for land ownership, citing religion not as binding legal
90. Id.
91. SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 131. As another marker of this shift, Chief
Justice Marshall deemphasizes the significance of the papal bull as a ground for
Spain's title to land in America: "Spain did not rest her title solely on the grant of
the Pope. Her discussions respecting boundary, with France, with Great Britain, and
with the United States, all show that she placed it on the rights given by discovery."
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
92. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573-77.
93. HENG, supra note 78.
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precedent in itself, but rather as evidence of compliance with the
discovery doctrine in international custom. Religion here is not the
source of law; it instead marks the establishment of a secularized
doctrine in a law of nations. Marshall's racially-conceived discovery
doctrine is the law of the land, while religion is cited as historical
evidentiary support for the dejure racial rule.
The Supreme Court thus invokes Christianity as a prerequisite for
ownership not within the order of a (formally) Christian republic, but
within the structure of international law-a law of racially-ordered
nations. As illustrated in part by the exclusively European titleholders
and the exclusion of indigenous peoples from land ownership in the
Court's narration, this international law operates as a legal sinew in
what Goldberg calls a "worldly web of racial arrangement." 94 In
Johnson, religion has yielded to a secular rule of law, yet it remains in
the discourses and practices of the state in regard to indigenous
peoples. As Chief Justice Marshall's opinion indicates, during the
period in which he writes, the United States subjected indigenous
peoples to a project of whiteness cultivation and Christianization that
would intensify in the latter part of that century. 95 As this era of
federal Indian law illustrates, religion remains expressly in the domain
of state action.
Although the secular state of this period may aim to remove itself
from involvement with religious expression (per the establishment and
free exercise clauses of the First Amendment, for instance), religion
exceeds the boundaries of secular containment, especially where it is
melded with race, flowing into the state's ruling practices and its
public account.9 6 In another context, Talal Asad argues that as
94. DAvID THEO GOLDBERG, THE RACIAL STATE 133 (2002).
95. See generally FREDERICK E. HOxIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO

1880-1920 (1984).
96. With the move to colorblindness in the United States in the following
century, race and religion would become articulated in a different yet related way.
Goldberg argues that the contemporary racial reasoning of racelessness conceives of
race as a "civic religion." GOLDBERG, THE RACIAL STATE, supra note 94, at 229.
Conforming to this notion, "the state cannot be seen to express itself in favor of one
rather than another in the public realm. But nor can the state interfere with private
racial expression, much as it is precluded by US constitutionalism from interfering
with religious speech." Id. While racism's excesses in the history of federal Indian
law have pushed religion (knotted with race) beyond formal secular containment and
into the realm of state action, with racelessness the state enforces the proscriptions
ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS,
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religion is reinserted into the public sphere in a secular state, the state
is imbued with the attributes of a rights-bearing, religiously-interested
individual:
[T]he modem idea of a secular society included a distinctive
relation between state law and personal morality, such that religion
became essentially a matter of (private) belief. . . . [T]he idea of

religious toleration that helps to define a state as secular begins
with the premise that because belief cannot be coerced, religion
should be regarded by the political authorities with indifference as
long as it remains within the private domain. The individual's
ability to believe what he or she chooses is translated into a legal
right to express one's beliefs freely and to exercise one's religion
without hindrance-so "religion" is brought back into the public
domain.... This indicates that the secular state, like others, is
conceived of as a person who can be morally threatened. 97
This personhood of the secular state, I suggest, is conjured with
particular vigor where race and religion are conjoined. Where racereligion conjunctions appear in the nineteenth-century secular United
States, racism's excesses propelled religion's reentry into the public
domain. Building upon Asad, I note that the state, knotting race and
religion, conceives of indigenous peoples as a moral threat and a
moral project, as beings whose racial and religious alterity must be
contained and kept at bay, and as candidates for conversion to
whiteness and Christianity. Conversion would become the prevailing
discourse in federal Indian law throughout the nineteenth century.
However, a conjured threat racially conceived still preoccupies the
Court in Johnson. "Although we do not mean to engage in the
defence [sic] of those principles which Europeans have applied to
Indian title," the Supreme Court explains, "they may, we think, find
some excuse, if not justification, in the character and habits of the
people whose rights have been wrested from them." 98 The Court thus
suggests a cultural conception of racial difference that follows in the
trajectory of Grotius's ruminations on races as cultural-linguistic
of secularism in regard to (and purports to divorce itself from) race, rendering the
effects of racist histories beyond redress.
97. TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY,
MODERNITY 205 (2003).

ISLAM,

98. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
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groupings. Here, the Johnson Court does not assert the possibility of
racial conversion. The character of indigenous peoples could not be
cultivated, the Court implies, as the racial excesses of their savagery
preclude such grooming. Indians were "a people with whom it was
impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct
society." 99 In this judicial dictum, the cultural-racial alterity of
indigenous peoples is not attended by an ascription of civilizability.
The Court thus evokes a form of cultural racism suggested by Balibar
in another context, a racism which posits the "insurmountability of
cultural differences," the "incompatibility of life-styles and
traditions," and the "harmfulness of abolishing frontiers."100
As the Supreme Court legitimated land appropriation-the
primary, "most radical legal title" 0 1-its pronouncements of title
were bound up with a racially differentiating logic. Johnson evinced a
shift from a respublica Christianato a Eurocentric international law
and illustrated the racial roots that inflect the discovery doctrine as
well as international law more generally.
V. CONCLUSION
While the medieval Christian order adhered to the authority of the
pope, the legal force of the papal mandate waned as the respublica
Christianagave way to a Eurocentric international law. Beginnings
of this shift may be seen in Vitoria's emergently racial and secular
treatise, On the Indians Lately Discovered. In moving from Vitoria to
Grotius, we may observe in the foundations of international law
In the
incipient examples of race's "fixity and fluidity." 02
began
racial
discourses
as
liquefaction conceiving land as sea, and
fluidly preying upon discursive building blocks that would render
those deemed racially different fixed in alterity, we find early
indications of the fluid and fixing powers of race in the germination of
international law, which became more express in the Johnson
decision. Tracing the juridical and religio-racial conceptions of
99. Id. at 590.
100. Etienne Balibar, Is There a "Neo-Racism"?, in

RACE, NATION, CLASS:

AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES 17, 21 (Etienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein eds.,

1991).
101.

SCHMITT, supra note 1, at 47.

102. Stoler, supra note 8, at 198.
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indigenous peoples of the Americas through the papal bulls, Vitoria,
Grotius, and Johnson v. M'Intosh, we see landmarks indicating the
racial roots and evolution of international law.
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